4/3 
. 54- 









Book :K4i. 




No. 1. 



THE 



BLUNDERS OF THE REBELLION 



AND THEIR 



DEAD-SEA FRUIT, 

In Six Numbers, 



:jeneral eeview of the causes which PROTEACTED 

the war, quadrupled its expense in waste 

op life, money, and national credit, 

AND BY THE 

REJECTION OF ALL METHOD, PLAN, OR PROVIDENCE IN AND OUT 
OF THE ARMY, HAS PRECIPITATED PRESENT RESULTS 



FUTURE DANGER TO THE UNION. 



By T^ WORTHINGTON, 

Forme*' Brig. Gen'l of Ohio Militia and Col. 4Gth Reg't Ohio Vols at the battle of Shiloh. 



WASHINGTON CITY: 
ises. 



5^^ 

\i'\ 



^- 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1869, by T. Worthington, in the Clerk's office 
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 



Washington, D. C, jyjarch 18, 1869. 
Hon. Senator Wilson, 

Of Massachusetts. 

Sir: In the winter of 1863, as now, you wero chairman of the Committee on 
Militarjr Affairs in the Senate. As such, I made known to j'ou certain facts rela- 
tive to the battle of Shiloh and the Tennessee campaign of 1862, which I thought 
required investigation by the Committee on the Conduct of the War. 

That investigation I thought was especially required, for the simple reason that 
the generals most directly concerned, rn general, and that one, to whom had been 
particularly accorded tiie salvation of the army of Tennessee, by themselves and 
friends in and out of Congress, had steadily resisted such an investigation, and 
have continued to resist it since the conclusion of tiie war. I had not at tliat time 
the following letter of objections to the court-martial, by which I was tried on false 
charges, at Memphis, August, 1862. The delay of this letter, with that of the rec- 
ord, is strong presumptive evidence against the truth of the charges. Had it 
reached the War Office in due course of mail, even after the delay ol the record, 
I would doubtless have been restored to service, and General Sherman's trial 
would have been the proper result. An examination of the record will at once 
disprove the groundless assertion of General Halleck, that General Sherman had 
saved the day on the 6th of April, 1862. 

The result of that utterly groundless statement of General Halleck is now before 
the people of the Union in sucli a combination of circumstances as are without a 
parallel in history, in the advancement of unworthy men to the highest civil and 
military positions under the Government. 

The consequences of that result are beginning to appear in the appointment of a 
general staff officer as head of the War Department. In the attachment of the 
great military bureaus to the personal staff of the General-in-Chief, who may or 
may not control the tens of millions of accounts, contracts, &c., yearly passing 
throu-:^h the -Quartermaster General's bureau, at his will, and in the nommatioa. 
of a distinguished general, lately in arms against the Union, to a pdace of trust and 
emolument; and this to the exclusion of men at least equally meritorious, who 
fought against the rebellion in the ranks of the Union armies. 

To these points I the other day respectfully called your attention, with the letter 
first above alluded to. That letter proves directly that to get clear of an obnoxious 
subordinate there were at least two or more ilagrant infractions of the Articles of 
War, by the present highest civil and military officers of the Republic, in which, 
was implicated the present Secretary of War. The question then arises, which will 
again occur m tiie course of this communication, are men who could thus violate 
the Articles of War, who did make use of their positions to subserve strictly personal 
purposes, and who did inflict wrong where there was every reason for forbearence 
or reward ; are such men, who have steadily resisted investigation into a campaign 
out of wliich has resulted tiieir present advancement, worthy of that implicit con- 
fidence claimed by themselves and friends from the National Legislature? 

It is very certain that no man is fit to be President who requires the restraint of 
the tenure- of -office law, and still more obvious that no man is fit to be trusted who 
demands its unconditional repeal ; and this seems more especially the case when the 
President has evinced a determination to appoint none but favorites or benefactors, 
because tliey are such, to places in his gift. As an educated soldier of the late war, 
and a citizen who has never sought or enjoyed the power or emoluments of civil 
or political position, I respectfully submit th& following record of the past. For 
its results your distinguished position will have rendered you in some sort respon- 
sible ; with that past your present action is bound by inevitable links. Let it be 
hoped for tlie party of the Union, that its present action may not, like the past 
blunders of the rebellion, produce little else than Dead Sea fruits for the future of 
the Republic. Very respectfullv, 

T. WORTHINGTON, 

Late Col. 46i/i Begt, 0. V. I. 



Letter of Ohjeclions. 

(Copy.) Fort Pickering, September 17, 1862. 

Adjutant General U. S. A. 

Sir: I would most respectfully call your attention to the record on case of the 
trial of Col. Thomas Wortiiington, 46lh regiment 0. V. I., by general court-martial, 
at Fort Pickering, Memphis, Tennessee, on the 14th August, 18G2, and submit 
whether from the evidence it is not apparent that Major General Sherman is the 
accuser or prosecutor. It also appears manifest of record that the court was 
ordered by General Shennau. Is this not an irregularity, (see sec. 65 Article of 
War act, 29th May, 1830,) for which the record and proceedings should be set 
aside? 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
[Signed] T. Worthington, 

Col. 'iGih Ih'jl. 0. V. I. 

Endorsements on the above. 

Headquarters 46th 0. V. I., 

September 17, 1862. 
Col. Worthington asks that the proceedings of his court-martial may be examined 
and set aside. 

[Signed] Chas C. Walcutt, 

Lt. Col. Com'g 46iA 0. V. I. 

IlEADaUARTERS 2d BrIG. 5tH DiV., FoRT PiCEERING, 

September 18, 1862. 
Re&p-'ctjxdly forwarded. Jso. Adair McDowell, 

Col. 6th Iowa Vols., 2d Brig. Comd'g. 
Respectfully forwarded. 

Col. Worthington knew that the subject-matter of the charges were made by 
General Sherman, and placed in the hands of the judge advocate. 

He might have excepted to them before pleading, but he did not, but actually 
courted the trial, and waived all objections on this point. The original proceed- 
ings were sent to the Adjutant General's office, Washington, D. C., before any 
order was made by me, and sent back with tlie endorsement of the Judge Advocate 
General, tliat they did not require the orders or afiproval of ihe President. 

Had Col. Worthington excepted to his trial at tlie right time, viz, before plead- 
ing, his exception would have been good. But it is now too late, as lie boaslingly 
waived all objections and courted investigation. The original proceedings will be 
sent to the War Department /or record. 

[Signed] W. T. Sherman, 

[No date T. W.] Maj. Qen. Comd'g. 

Headquarteks Dist. West Tknnnessee, 

Jack.son, Tenn., October 18, 1862, 
Respectfully forwarded to the Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C. 
[Signed] U. S. Grant, 

Maj. Qen. 
Adjutant General's Office, 

November 4, 1862. 
Respectfully referred to the Judge Advocate General for report. 

By order of the Secretary of War. 
[Signed] Thomas M. Vincent, 

Asst. Adft Oen. 

Returned to the Adjutant General November 9. See mem. within. 
The mem. within is as follows: [In pencil, T. W.] 

"Returned to the Adjutant General. The Secretary of W^ar will direct what order 
Bhall be issued in this case." 

[Signed] ' C. P. Buckingham. 

Brig. Oen., A. A. G. 



[Enclosed is also a slip of paper, on which is written in pencil as follows, and 
doubtless from Adjutant General's office: T. W.] 

November M, 1862. 

" Repeated drunkenness and publishing libellous matter of his superior officers, 
Col. McDoiuell and Generals Grant and Sherman. 

[It will be perceived that the above letter, of September 17th, does not appear as 
forwarded from Jackson till October 18, and is not repoited on by the Judge Adv. 
General till November 19th, 1862. The promotions consequent upon Col. Worth- 
ington's illegal dismissal by General Slierman had been made over a montli before, 
and to cover up tliis illegal proceeding, and other infractions of the Articles of War 
in the matter of Col. Worthington's trial, and above all to cover up the misconduct 
of Col. Worthington's accusers at and before the battle of Shiloh, his dismissal was 
recommended, as a worthless officer, under the law of July 17th, 1862. 

The delay in approving this recommendation by the Secretary of War on the 
request of General E. P. Buckingham, and tlie subsequent delivery of this letter 
to Col. Worthington, prevented the accomplishment of the intended purpose, wliich 
had been to dismiss an officer whose troops held the extreme right of the Union 
army on the 6th of April, 1862, without aid or eticouragement from General Sher- 
man, long enough to secure from ruin the Army of Tennessee till the arrival of 
the Army of the Ohio at 5 p. m. of that terrible day.— T. W.] 



Abstract of proceedings and findings of the court by which Colonel Worthington, 
4:6th Ohio Volunteers, vjas tried at Memphis, in August, 1862. 

Headquarters, 5th Divis., Army of Tennessee, 

Memphis, Sep>tember 16, 1862. 
[General Order No. 83,] 

Before a general court martial, assembled at Memphis, Tennessee, August 14, 
1862, &C-, &c., was arraigned and tried Colonel Thos. Worthington, 46th regiment 
Ohio Volunteers. 

[Here follow the charges, of which the main charge, to which the others were 
merely accessory, was the third— "/or conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle- 
man"- — [the specifications under which were as follows; — T. W.] 

In this, that the said Colonel Thomas Worthington, of the 46th Ohio Volunteers, 
did print, or cause to be printed, on a sheet for circulation, what purported to be 
extracts from his diary of the Tennessee expedition, containing false and libellous 
matter, calculated and designed to injure his superior officers. Colonel McDowell 
and General Grant and General Sherman. 

In this, that the said Colonel Worthington did print or cause to be printed, for 
circulation, what pur[>orted to be extracts from his diary of the Tennessee expedi- 
tion, designed to secure for himself a popular reputation for prophecy and fore- 
sight, which said diary was not made contemporaneous with the dates set forth in 
it, but wa,s fabricated or manufactured, after the occasion, to fulfill some base and 
dishonorable purpose. 

To whicii the prisoner pleaded not guilty. 

[The court found Colonel Worthington guilty of the first ipecification where 
stated, that is. printing the diary extracts for circulation, &c., and sentenced him 
to be " cashiered."— 'Y W.] 

II. The proceedings in the foregoing case were referred to the President of the 
United States, under the 65th Article of War, and returned with the endorsement, 
that in time of " war" the approval of the sentence in such cases by the President 
is not requisite, but is within the power of the officer assembling the court. 

The findings and sentence are accordingly approved, and Colonel Thomas 
Worthington ceases to be an officer of the volunteer army of the United States 
from this date. 

By order of Major General W. T. Sherman: 

Captain L. M. Dayton, 

A. A. A. General. 



Judge Advocate General's Office, 

November 19, 1862. 
Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

Sir.: I beg to call your attention to the record of the proceedings of a general 
court-martial held at Fort Pickering, Memphis, Tennessee, under General Order 
No. 69, issued by Major General Sherman, on the 12th August, 1862, and which 
resulted in the dismissal of Colonel Tliomas Worthington from the service. 

This officer now complains of the proceedings as irregular, and insists that the 
finding and sentence are inoperative, and should be disregarded, because Major 
General Sherman, bj^ whom the court-martial was ordered specially for his trial, 
■was also ids " accuser or prosecutor" in the case. 

The objection seems to me well taken. The act of 29th of May, 1830, sec. 1, 
declares, that "whenever a general officer commanding an army, or a colonel com- 
manding a separate department, shall be the accuser or prosecutor of any officer 
in the array of the United States under his command, the general court-martial, 
for the trial of such officer, shall be appointed by the President of the United 
States." 

During the progress of the trial. Colonel Worthington formally objected, in 
writing, " to proceeding further without knowing by whom the charges were drawn 
or advanced." His objection was overuled. This was irregular. Every officer 
on trial before a general court-martial is entitled to this information, since without 
it he can never certainly know whether the tribunal before which he is arraigned 
has been legally constituted or not. Major General Sherman now states in writing 
that the subject-matter of the charges were made by him, and placed in the hands 
of the iudge advocate. This, it is believed, constituted liim an " accusor or prose- 
cutor," in the sense of the act of 29th May, 1830, and from him as such the power 
to appoint the court-martial was expressly withheld and given to the President. 
His action, therefore, in ordering a court-martial specially for the trial of au officer 
against whom he had preferred the charges to be investigated being without legal 
sanction, the court itself was without color of authority, and its proceedings and 
findings are a nullity. 

The matter of defence now urged, did not, as the commanding general supposes, 
constitute a plea in abatement, which should have been presented at an earlier stage 
of the proceedings. The irregularity suggested, does not call in question merely 
the jurisdiction of the court to try Colonel Worthington, but its existence as a 
legally organized tribunal. It is never too late to insist on so radical and fatal 
a defect as this. It is of the highest importance that the administration of public 
justice, as well in the military as in the civil service, should be not only pure, but 
unsuspected. This, however, could not be the case where a commanding general, 
with all the moral power which belongs to his position, is permitted at once to prefer 
■charges against his officers and to organize courts-martial for their trial. 
[Signed] Jos. Holt, 

Judge Advocate General. 

It appears from the above letter and opinion — 

1st. That when General W. T. Sherman executed the sentence of an illegal court 
by his General Order 33, (herewith submitted,) he had not referred the record to 
the proper department in obedience to the Articles of War, or this opinion would 
have bpen sooner given. 

2d. i'hat he had not even submitted the same to (General (rrant, commanding 
the district, who tiierefore recxecuted the sentence October 1, 1862. 

3d. That tliere was and is no such endorsement on the record b}' the Judge Advo- 
cate General as that statetl by General Sherman in his order executing the sentence. 

4th. Tliat Judge Advocate General Holt would not likely return a record with 
such an endorsement of the findings and proceedings of a court, pronounced by 
him a nullity and without color of authority. 

5th. That the record did not leave Jackson, Tennessee, before the 14th October, 
1862. 

6th. Thattjeneral Grant must iiave issued his order of October 1, 1SG2, reexe- 
cuting the sentence, without knowledge of its previous execution by General 
Sherman. 



7lh. That Judge Advocate McCoy acted in disobedience of the Articles of Waf 
in retaining the record for at least six weeks after the trial and two weeks after 
the illegal execution of the sentence by General Sherman. 

8th. That Acting Adjutant General Rawlins was accessory to this disobedience, 
and repeated the same, by retaining the record from the 1st to the 14th October, 
1863, if not longer. 

9th. That Generals Sherman and Grant were both accessory to this infraction 
of the Articles of War by their several staff officers. 

10th. Tliat General Sherman's order 83, Sei)tember 16, 1862, which should be 
part of the record, is not on file in the Judge Advocate General's office, and was 
not forwarded to General Grant. 

11th. That Colonel Worthington's letter of objection.s, September 17, 1862, on 
which was based Judge Holt's opinion declaring the proceedings and findings a 
nullity, was retained by General Sherman till after the record had reached General 
Grant. 

12th. That, if not so retained by him, General Grant or General Rawlins, or 
both, are responsible for its retention in Tennessee till October 18, 1862, or after 
that date 

13th. That the question of Colonel W.'s exclusion from, or return to, service 
turned on the delay of this letter, can now be proven. 

14th. ThiXt the promotions consequent on Colonel W.'s dismissal were illegally 
made, not only before the record had been examined by the Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral, but before the same had reached the War Department at Washington, and 
were, therefore, void in law. 

15th. That Colonel W. was not dismissed as a worthless officer, inj^irious to the 
service, because his letter of objections, to which was attached a slip, in pencil, with 
reasons for the recommendation for hisdismissal, was not acted on by the Secretary 
of War ; such inaction being based upon General C. P. Buckingham's request that 
the matter might be delayed till Colonel W reached Washington ; and that, in a 
request for the papers relating to his dismissal, this letter, with Judge Holt's re- 
port on the case, came into his possession, a copy of which is herewith submitted, 
with the endorsements thereon. 

16th. There is, therefore, no record of Colonel W.'s dismissal, except by the 
illegal order. No. 83, for the execution of an illegal sentence by a court without 
color of authority, as declared by Judge Advocate General Holt. 

17th. That General Grant, when approving Colonel W.'s honorable discharge, 
January 8, 1867, could not iiave been aware that the sentence of the court, therein 
referred to, was without color of authority, and its proceedings declared a nullity 
y the Judge Advocate General. 

18th. That if Colonel W. had been dismissed by any other proceeding, said dis- 
missal would, doubtless, have been revoked on the face of his honorable discharge. 

19th. That the detention by General Sherman, &c., of Colonel W.'s letter of 
September 17, 1862, affords ample evidence against the validity of his charges and 
the findings of his illegal court. T. W. 



Exlr acts from, a Diary of the Tennessee Expeditioji, 1862, hy T. Worthington, Col- 
onel 46i/i Regiment 0. V. 1. 

Wednesday, March 26, 1862. — At Camp Shiloh, three miles from Pittsburg 
Landing. A company being called for picket duty to-day, detailed Captain 
Sharp's Company B. Indications of an attack, if the country people are to be 
believed. Their pickets are around, ana too near us, showing a strong effective 
force. 

Thursday, March 27, 1862 — This afternoon two of Sharp's pickets were fired 
on by the rebel horse, about 4J p. m., not a mile frona camp. A disgrace to the 
army that such should be the case, and an indication that they are covering some 
forward movement, yet Sherman is improvident as ever, and takes no defensive 
and scarce any precautionary measures. He snubs me, and has no time to hear 
even a "'-""Hon. 



Feiday, March 28, 1862. — Having suggested to McD.owell the sending out of a 
stronger picket, he ordered thirty more men, which were iinmediateiy volunteered. 
If Beauregard does not attack us, he and the chivalry are disgraced forever, if for 
nothing else. 

Saturday, March 29,1862 — Sherman has refused to sign a requisition for 
seventy-two axes for ray regiment, making it twenty-two; and while a slight 
abattis might prevent or avert an attack, there are no axes to make it, nor is there 
a sledge or crowbar in his division, and scarce a set of tools out of my regiment. 

Monday, March 31, 1862. — Further indications through the pickets that an 
attack is imminent, and though I do not fear the result, a sudden attack, if vio- 
lently made, as it will be, may throw us back for months. The men are discouraged 
at our delay here and the close vicinity of the rebel pickets, which should be driven 
off. Sherman is inviting an attack,' which I hope may occur, but for which we 
are unprepared. 

Tuesday, April 1, 1862. — Have now over one hundred rounds of ammunition 
for all available men, and feel easy on that point. Ordered the cajitains to send 
in accounts of clothing, &c., wanted, which the quartermaster is very careles.s 
about getting. Still no axes, which now he cannot get if he would, and which are 
worth more than guns at present. 

Thursday, April 3, 1863. — Rode to Pittsburg Landing. The place is crowded 
and in disorder below, with noise and gambling on the bank above, across the 
road from the post office. Hunted up and down for clothing and axes, and found 
that Sherman had forbidden his quartermaster from receiving anything. That 
General Smith's quartermaster will answer no requisitions outside of his immediate 
command, and the post quartermaster, Baxter, (Grant's,) will only answer the 
requisitions of the division quartermasters. The reason that Sheriuan's quarter- 
master will not receive any stores is, that he has no place to put them. There 
are now at least six boats hired by the day at the Landing, (as I hear,) at no less 
than two thousand (-$2,000) a day, when two thousand dollars with that many 
men could, in ten days or less, put up store-houses sufficient for an army of one 
hundred thousand men. And so the Government will pay on this expedition so 
far not less than twenty thousand dollars, and perhaps ten times that before the 
war is over, and lose not less than one to ten million dollars in quartermaster and 
commissary stores, occasioned by the improvidence and neglect of its major gen- 
erals here, to say nothing of the disorder and danger growing out of such a state 
of things. 

The indications are (still) of an attack, which I have also indicated to McDowell ; 
we should now have on our riglit at least six batteries, and two regiments of cav- 
alry to warn the rear. With thick woods before us and pickets scarce a mile out, 
we have no defences whatever, and no means of giving an alarm but by the fire 
of musketry. The troops cover too much ground, and cannot support each other, 
and a violent attack, which we may expect, may drive them back in detail. God 
help us, with so many sick men in camp, if we are attacked, there being over five 
thousand unfit for duty. 

Friday, April 4, 1862. — One of McDowell's pickets was shot in the hand about 
noon. A detail of Taylor's cavalry was sent out three or four miles; found four to 
six hundred rebel cavalry, and fell back, returning about 2 p. m. 

Everything is carried on in a very negligent way, and nothing but tho same 
conduct on tiie other side can save us from disaster. They can concentrate one 
hundred thousand men from the heart of rcbeldoin, and, with three or four rail- 
roads, have far greater facilities for handling troops than we have. 

Have brigade orders to stack arms at daylight till further order;. Keep two 
companies lying on their arms, and though as quiet as possible, look for an attack 
every hour. 

Saturday, April 5, 1862. — Rode out to Sharp's pickets at sunrise, and found two 
men (rebel pickets) wounded 5'esterday, who died last night at the Widow Howell's. 
About 7 o'clock a. m. the rebels drove in Lieutenant Crary from the Widow How- 
ell's, getting possession of their dead men. Heard in the evening that the rebels 
had established three guns (six-pounders) opposite Hildebrand's brigade, on our 
left, accross the valley. Hear of five of their regiments arriving to-day. 

Sunday, April 6, 1862 — A clear cool morning. Rode out to the pickets at sua- 



rise, and soon after the enemy were seen advancing past the Howell house. Di- 
rectly one of Colonel Hicks's regiment, 40th Illinois, was shot through the heart, at 
not less than four hundred yards. Rode to McDowell's quarters, (not up,) and 
then back to the pickets, and ordered tlie men who had i'allen back to advance to 
the Howell fence. Returned to camp for preparation, and at about 7 a. m. the 
attack commenced on Hildebrand's and Back'land's brigades. This might have 
been expected, but we were really not ready for a fight. No hospitals at Pittsburg, 
nor even means to carry off the wounded. 

Apeil 25, 1862. 
The undersigned hereby certify that most of the facts above set forth are correct 
from their own knowledge, and that Colonel Worthington's remarks and anticipa- 
tions are in correspondence with his general conversation for ten days before the 
battle of the 6th of April, 1862. 

William Smith, Maj. 4Gth Reg. 0. V. I. 

J. W. Heath, Capt. Co. A, 46th Reg. V I. 

A. G Sharp, " B, 

Jno. Wiseman, " C, " " 

Ed. N. Upton, Lt. c'dg. D, 

Wm. Finney, Capt. Co. E. 

P. A. Crow, " G, " " 

M. C. Lilly, " H. 

C. C. Lybland, " I, " " 

I.N.Alexander." K, " '■ 



Fort Fayette St.^tion, M and C. Railroad, Tenit., 

July nth, 1862. 
Major General Halleck : 

When I first had the pleasure of seeing you, on the 17th of last April, I was not 
aware that you had written that it was the unanimous opinion of the army at 
Shiloh that General Sherman had saved the day on the 6th, &c. Had I known it, 
I would have at once dissented from that opinion, and would have sent, through 
the regular channel, the enclosed extracts from my diary, which I then said were 
equivalent to grave charges against General Sherman. You then refused to sea 
them, but said I might send them through the regular channel, and submit such 
observations as I thought proper on the battle of Shiloh. Afterwards, I think at 
Monterey, you said you had expected a communication from me, hoping, perhaps, 
to see something spicy, as you expressed it. 

I first saw your recommendation of General Sherman for major general at Camp 
No. 7, and but for subsequent events up to the present time would have taken such 
a course with the enclosed extracts as will eventually lead to their publication. 

Having a little leisure here, I have had the extracts copied, and you now have 
them, with such crude remarks as I can hastily throw together, referring you to a 
report of the proceedings of my regiment, &c., for their proper understan ling. I 
hold General \V. T. Sherman responsible for the condition of tlie army at Shiloh up. 
to the 7th of April, and besides what occurred in his own division, for everything 
arising out of liiat condition, directly or indirectly. And this for the reason that 
to him was confided the advance of the expedition of Tennessee. He is, or is sup- 
posed to be, a man of more intellect than any general officer engaged in that bat- 
tle. There was a general disposition to give him every opportunity to develop his 
military abilities before and especially on the second day of tlie battle, and the 
chiefs of the army have concurred, without dissent, and equally without investiga- 
tion, according to your statement, in giving him the most favorable and prominent 
position in the result of those about equally disastrous days. Far more disastrous 
in their immediate results, as they will doubtless prove in their ultimate conse- 
quences, than the writer of the diary anticipated. General Sherman was entirely 
aware of everything occurring or likely to occur, which is expressed or implied, or 
supposed probable, in the above extracts. He had, or might have had, almost 
perfect means of knowing from day to day, whatever occurred at Corinth, or 
among the rebels near there. He might have controlled the position of all the 
five divisions at Shilob. His request or remonstrance wo.uld have been equally 



8 

regarded and acted upon. But that he made any such, wit!i or without effect, has 
never been asserted. He should then be held responsible not only for the position 
of the whole army, but for the manner in which it was brought into action. His 
own division was as well jiosted as any other. So far as his division was concerned, 
on the 6th of April, no division could have been much worse handled. And, first 
the position naturally was strong, yet unimproved it was weak, as was proven by 
the result. 

On the other hand, of the six conditions desirable for a tactical position, as very 
ably and concisely set forth in " Halleck's Elements of Military Art and Science," 
all but the third could have been, and that was partially fulfilled.* Yet the first 
was not fulfilled, as to the debauches, &c. ; nor the second as to the artillery ; nor the 
fourth as to the desired view of the enemy ; nor the fifth as to the protection of 
the flanks; nor the sixth as regarded a safe retreat. 

All this has no doubt been obvious to yourself, and can now be established by 
a glance at the ground. No means of satisfying any important one of the above 
conditions need liave conflicted with another. Two thousand axes in six hours 
would liave fulfilled the whole of these conditions, even including No. 3, yet not 
one of them was satisfied, and we know the consequences. 

That great rule of war, which requires the calling in all detachments on the eve 
of a battle, was violated by leaving Stuart's brigade near two miles ofi', when it 
might have been called in as late as 7 o'clock a. m. on the 6th, or even later, and 
in conjunction with tlie first brigade and Behr's battery, which remained idle, 
could easily have repulsed the first attack of ten rebel regiments and riot over a 
single battery. This result would also have obviated any necessity on the part of 
Stuart's brigade to protect the left flank of the position, for which 1 have only 
heard since the battle it was specially detached. 

So far as General Sherman's handling of the division is concerned, it is obvious, 
first, that with twelve regiments and three batteries, but five regiments and two 
batteries were used to repel the first attack at 7 a. m., Appier's, the 53d Ohio, 
being so isolated that it could neither give or receive support, and Stuart's brigade 
beincf in the same condition; second, that the first brigade was utterly ignored, 
when it might have sooner and easier decided the fate of the d'a}^ than at length 
it did; third, that Behr's battery, which might have been drawn off with the first 
brigade was thrown into the victorious path of the rebels, one gun excepted ; 
fourth, that the artillery was not in position till half an hour after the attack 
commenced. That neither battery was on either flank of his centre, and oddly 
enough, that the only battery (Belir's) which could and should have delivered a 
most effective flank fire at .short range, was left idle till given up as above stated;: 
fifth, all the artilhn-y was useless by noon, from capture or want of ammunition. 

The fact, if it is a fact, that Barrett's battery was out of ammunition in less than 
five hours ai'ter its attack commenced, while there was ample ammunition at the 
river, reminds me that in your "Elements," etc., above referred to, it is ruled that 
every battery should have ammunition sufiicient for a day or twelve hours, which 
was "here utterly disregarded. 

The condition, then, of Sherman's division about noon was, that Stuart's brigade, 
left alone on the extreme left, after a heroic defence, was finding its retreat inevit- 
able, as afterwards occurred, without assistance to or from its proper division. 

Waterhoufe's battery had been useless three hours by no fault of its officers. 
Barrett's was out of ammunition, with ample stores less than two miles oft", and 
Behr's or Morton's battery had been " turned over " to the rebels, who were using 
it against us ; Hildebrand's brigade, after the retreat of the 53d Ohio, twice drove 



* Note. Fiom cliaptor ."ith of "Hallfick's Kleiiients of Milit.iry Art and Science," pag» 115 ; "The 

first c(in<iilioii to he Biiti,.-lio(l ti.v ;i tactical position is, tliat tlio ileljoiichcs (outli-ts) sliall lii' more favor- 
able ("V falliiiK '>" ttie enemv when he has apprDached to the desired i)uint, than those which the enemy 
can have for attackin;; our ">"• n line of battle. Second. The artillery shonlcl liave its full eftect on all 
the avenues of approach. Third. We slionld have good uronnd for mancunvriiig our own troops unsoon, 
if iiossildi-, by the enemy. Fourth. We should have a full view of the enemy's manuoevres as he ad- 
vances to'tlio attack. Fifth. We should have the flanks of our line well protected by natural or 
artificial obHtaclcs. Sixth. We should have some means of effecting a retreat without exposing our 
arnij to destruction." 

Camp Near Monteket, May 7, 1862. 
Major General IIaIjLECk ; 



9 

the advancing enemy back over the brow of the height in front, and had it been, 
as it might have been, properly supported, vfould have changed tlie whole fate of 
the day. At noon, however, it did not exist as a brigade, and Colonel Hildebrand 
had taken command of several portions of disintegrated regiments, and was keep- 
ing back the rebel advance about the middle of McClernand's camp. Much the 
same may be said of Buckland's brigade, from whicli its left regiment, the 70th Ohio, 
had been entirelj- separated, and which was at this time entirely destitute of inte- 
gration, yet its best and bravest men, with scraps of other regiments, were striving 
hopelessly against a victorious and superior force, just reinforced by five guns of 
Behr's battery, all of which might have been avoided by a little providence twen- 
ty-four hours before that time, and a slight exercise of tactics at 9 a. m. 

Fortunately, about this time (noon) McDowell's neglected brigade, having care- 
fully avoided an attack on the rebel rear or flank, found its right suddenly out- 
flanked by a superior force of rebels in ambush. A bold and instanl change of 
front to the right by the 46th Ohio, and an advance of thirty yards, with a steady, 
crashing fire, disconcerted and drove them back, thus rendering the brigade effec- 
tive for two hours, which time might have been indefinitely extended by a proper 
disposition of the troops and proper attention to the artillery so causelessly with- 
drawn. To make things worse, I have also heard that Barrett's battery was not 
out of ammunition, but was withdrawn for the purpose of making a charge, or an 
advance, by the 40th regiment Illinois volunteers. Colonel Hicks, on a strongly 
supported rebel battery out of sight, and some five hundred yards in front. Here 
was a gross violation of a general rule of Napoleon's, referred to on page 292 of 
" Halleck's Elements," &e. The consequences in this case entirely sustained the 
rule, for this gallant little regiment, (four hundred and fifty strong,) after an ad- 
vance of three-fourths of the distance, was compelled to retire before a tenfold 
force, with the loss of near half its number, and Colonel Hicks incurably wounded. 

Had the artillery then present been, as it might have been, in a condition for 
service, this reckless charge or advance would, as it should, at any late, have been 
avoided, and even the capture of General Prentiss delayed till the arrival of Gen- 
eral Buell, but one hour after Prentiss surrendered; or even if. instead of this 
advance on the artillery by the 40th, the whole force of the first brigade had been 
thrown back into a strong and wooded position a few hundred yards m the rear 
at the time the first brigade came up (noon,) the same result might and probably 
would have been attained 

The above is a mere sketch of the operations of Sherman's division from 7 a. 
m. till 2 p. m. on that terrible day. Seven hours, fraught not only with immi- 
nent risk to the Army of Tennessee, but, as events are proving, with the whole 
course and possibly the event of the war, lengthened for months, or perhaps 
years, by the manner and result of these operations. 

I have neglected to say, that General Sherman was in the camp of the 53d Ohio, 
the. weakest part of his line, when the attack commenced, and wliere his orderly 
was killed, when he rode instantly away to his centre, and there remained in 
general till it was driven back, as the report sets forth. 

The conclusions, so far as General Sherman is eoncerned, from the above state- 
ments are, that, first, his utter disregard of the immediate and obvious indications 
of an attack after Friday noon, as shown by his leaving all things as they were; 
second, his utter disregard of his artillery, with respect more especially to its am- 
munition; third, his failing to make any provision for his own wounded and sick 
men : fourth, his fatuity in leaving useless his right brigade, to say nothing of his 
left, eitlier of which might, if thrown on either rebel flank, have driven back the 
first attack even as late as 8 a. ra. ; fifth, his unaccountable sacrifice of five guns 
of Behr's battery, when the whole might h;ive been, as one gun was, preserved with 
the first brigade ; sixth, his useless and reckless waste of life in the charge by Col- 
onel Hicks's 40th Hlinois regiment; seventh, his so hastily leaving the weakest 
and most exposed part of his line, where his presence would seem most needed; 
and, eighth, the fact of his leaving such a point so exposed ; — present the strongest 
salients in his connection with the battle of Shiloh, on the 6th day of April, 1862. 

Having derived much of my information from others, I can voucli for nothing to 
which I was not myself a witness. Nothing, however, which I have seen or heard 
could support the conclusion that he acted any important part m saving the day 



10 

on the 6th of April, or that it was the opinion of a single regiment of his division 
that such was the case. 

On tlie other hand, the inevitable conclusion from a review of the diary extracts 
and the facts above stated is, that General W. T. Sherman did more to prepare the 
army of Tennessee for a defeat on the Bth of April, and more to accomnlish that 
defeat in Ihe course of the battle, than any officer on either side, on the bloody field 
of Shiloh. Very respectfally, yours, 

T. WORTHINGTON, 

Colonel 4:6th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. 



SiR: I consider it my duty to call your attention to the enclosed ''Circular." 

However creditable to the zeal of General Sherman, it certainl}- can dolittle credit 
to the energy of the service, nor is it encouraging to the troops, on whom it \f. 
calculated to have a depressing effect. If we are to be put upon iialf rations and 
chance forage at thirteen miles from our base of operations by a few hours rain, how 
can the army hope within any reasonable time to effect the object of its organization 
and put an end to the war? One- third of the men in this army would bridge the 
road to the river in a day with proper tools, which we should have. This done, 
there would be no trouble about getting on material, while the moral effect would 
be equal to twenty thousand men. 

So far as forage for the horses, &c., is concerned, there is not an elm or cotton- 
wood to a square mile, and they will not eat sassafras. I do not in the least 
apprehend an attack, but see no' reason why the enemy could not bring up artillery 
on account of the roads, having done so a month ago; 

I also enclose Order No 21, exhibiting far more zeal than discretion. Men with 
the usual camp disease above all things require quiet, and whatever their disposi- 
tion, are not in a condition to studv brigade drill. The object of such orders is 
obviousl)^ to produce discontent and demoralization, of which there is an ample 
amount existing. 

If an effort were made to supply the troops with fresh bread and better hospitals, 
the effect would be far more ol)vious in their improved organization than any 
benefit which can result from such orders as the above. 
Very respectfully, 

T. WORTHINGTON, Ool 46th Re(jt 0. V. I. 



CIRCULAR. 

Our situation from the rain and roads has become difficult, and it becomes the 
duty of every efficient man to anticipate our danger and to labor. Every ounce 
of food and fora.ge must be regarded as precious as diamonds 

Roads will be impassable and our bridges swept away. General Halleck and 
our superior ofii','ers will do all they can, but their power is limited by nature. 

We must do our part in full. Men must at once be limited in bread and meat. 
All live stock in our lines must be driven in and used, and all grass, wheat, and 
everything fit for forage gathered. Horses will be allowed to eat on bushes, such 
as elm, cotton-wood, and sassafras, gathered for this use at once. Particular at- 
tention must be given at once to our roads and defences. Let every axe and spade 
be busy. At daybreak a party from each brigade will open a road by clearing 
the underbrush back to the ridge. In front of the whole line, underbrush must 
be cut to a distance of tiiroo hundred \'ards, and heavy logs felled as a breastwork 
along the front of the artillery and camps. Picket guards and sentinels must be 
visited often, and the utmost vigilance maintained. Monterej' is the key point. 
We cannot be assailed by artillery, because the enemy cannot haul it up, but we 
may be assailed by hordes of infantry night and day; tiierefore vigilance must be 
kept — neglect at any and all times promptly punished. 

If any sentinel will not be wakeful and intelligent, let him be forced to work. 
Our right is the point of danger, and will receive the personal attention of the 
general, but he can do nothing unless his orders are strictly observed, and these 



11 

are that all articles of provision and forage be pnt under guard and dealt out at 
half rations. Tliat the guard to our front be prepared with log breastworks and 
defences, and underbrush cleared to our rear to admit of prompt and easy commu- 
nication, not to retreat on, but to afford means of drawing assistance, and to move 
regiments from one point to another of our lines if need be. Orders heretofore 
issued cover the whole ground, and this i.s meant to remind all of their importance. 
Maps will at once be prepared and sent to brigadiers, who sliould furnish colonels 
and subordinates with copies. 

By order of Brigadier General W. T. Sherman. 

J. H. Hammond, A. A. Gen'L 

Camp No. 3, May 5th, 1862. 



Headquarters Fifth Division, 

Grant's Corps d'Armee, April 25, 1862. 
[Orders No. 21.] 

The importance of brigade drill is such, that the commanding general will per- 
mit no officer or soldier to be absent if he can p)ossibly be on the ground either in 
the ranks, armed or unarmed, or as a witness. 

Officers to be excused must be in the hospital or excused by the division surgeon, 
Dr. Hartshorn. Soldiers to be excused must be in hospital, on picket, or a sentinel 
on post. The camp guard, except sentinels on post, and all working parties, must 
be called in and put on drill, unless by an order in writing by the commanding 
general. 

No colonel of a regiment, or captain of a company, will undertake to excuse 
from drill. If the men are unable to bear arms, they will form on the left of the 
company, unarmed. If not in hospital, but suffering from diarrhoea, they can be 
hauled to the drill-ground by the colonel's order, and there they must be silent 
and observe the movements of the division. Drill will take place daily at 3 p.m., 
unless it be actually raining. 

By order of Brigadier General W. T. Sherman: 

J. H. Hammond, A. A. General. 

Official : W. H. Harlanu, A. A. A G. 



L. •' C. 



Washington, B. C, March 18, 1869. 
Hon. J. G. GARFIELD : 

Shortly after General Sherman had attached the four great Military Bureaus to his' 
personal staff, it was stated by a gentleman of Ohio, connected with the press that 
this attachment was a ^'gobbling up " by the General himself, he of the press knew 
not on what authority. 

The same evening, March 13th, the writer called on you for information, and as 
4s expressed in his diary, you answered that the Military Committee had agreed upon a 
report, not yet printed, expressing the opinion that the management of these Bureaus 
was rather an administrative than a legislative matter, or, on some such authority, the 
President had tied them to the General's personal staff. 

It seemed a little singular that you should think such an attachment so much of a 
trifle; and, indeed, so far the measure seems to have attracted little or no attention in 
or out of Congress, Is it, indeed, so much of a trifle to place, by a simple order of 
his own, more or less directly under the immediate control of the Army General, all 
the myriad millions of dollars of claims, contracts, and accounts perpetually passing to 
and from the Treasury Department ? Is it consistent to remove, as has been constitu- 
tionally done, the Treasury Department from the immediate control of tho President, 
and permit the head of the Army to constitute himself, by a special order of general 
intent, virtual comptroller of the Treasury, so far as the flscal affairs of these great 
Bureaus are concerned, and the fountain or distributor of all their subordinate appoint- 
ments ? 

Is it a trifle that the head of the Army, in peace or in war, by a mere hieroglyphic 
scratch agreed on, or by a word endorsed on any paper, passing either way from these 
Bureaus to or from the Treasury, may accelerate, retard, or condemn it at his will ? 

Is it a trifle to consider that, if the chiefs of these great Bm'eaus are members of his 
personal staff, the tens of thousands of attaches and employees of these Bureaus are 
more or less integral fractions or atoms of his staff — ^more or less dependent on his 
word or will ; and that he may, with entire propriety, claim their appointment or 
removal as necessary to the efficient performance of his military duties? 

Add to these (as the nomination of a distinguished confederate oflioer jjlainly 
foreshadows) the many thousands of reconstructed but yet unannealed reb^-ls lately in 
arms against tlie Union. Let them, too, swell these myriads of dependents on a strictly 
military administration. 

What, in comparison to this devoted army, if once put in array, were the ten 
thousand, or the hundred thousand Cornel ii of Sulla in his retirement; or what to them 
were the prystorian cohorts of the Empire in its decline; and how long miglit it be, 
under the present maturing elements of such a decline, before the institutions even of 
this Republic might totter towards their fall? 

Consider, too, the man who, as the military arm of the President, is to control this 
fearful moral force, and these myriads of dependents on his favor, his caprice, or his 
vindictive will. 



Was he ever known to place any man on his personal staff, and keep him there, 
tvho was not as entirely subsei-vient as a valet or an orderly ; who had the capacity 
Dr courage, and much less the disposition, to breathe a syllable of remonstrance or 
complaint on any account, whatever may have been his personal acts or military 
)perations ? 

You, it is believed, were in some sort a witness to one of these brilliant operations 
the day after the battle of Shiloh, April 8, 1862. You saw that, by means of his 
liis strategy or tactics, or by the absence of both, or either, one of his best regiments 
was ridden over by a handful of Forest's cavalry, and but for the presence of troops, 
in whole or in part under your command, a whole Union brigade would have been 
scattered without an etfort on his part to stay the mischief he had made, and all this 
by a few hundred, or less, of the disorganized troops of a defeated rebel army in dis- 
orderly retreat. * 

If, instead of being such a commander as he was, he were a million of Washing- 
tons made into one, such an attachment of these Bureaus would be an incongruity, if 
not an outrage, under any free Government. 

In conclusion, it is very respectfully suggested that the Military Committee of the 
House may in some sort be held responsible for the future conduct of this militant 
pagod, "with front of brass, a feet of clay," as brittle as his accidental reputation — a 
reputation based upon the omissions of the late Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
even now, may it be hoped, to be corrected. 

Yours, very respectfully, 

T. WORTHINGTON, 

Late Colonel iGth Ohio Volunteers. 



♦Soon after forming in line of battle, a large body of cavalry ma'de a bold and dashing charge on 
the skirmishers and whole regiment. So sudden and rapid was the charge, shooting our men with 
carbines and revolvers, they had no time to reload or fix bayonets, and were forced to fall back 
under cover of our cavalry. Unhappily, the cavalry were not sufficiently near to render assistance. 
The rebel cavalry literally rode down the infantry. We sustained a loss in killed, wounded, and 
missing of fifty-seven men. Nineteen were killed on the spot, thirty wouuded, and the balance 
missing, — Extract from Colonel Hildebraad's Report. 



^regoing m-attei* Will be paft oi the Ajipeiidix to the proposed >»ork when finishedj btit 
now for Special purposesi T, W. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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